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Archive for November, 2012

The Look of Future Military Deployments, Continued: The Small Unit of Action

Monday, November 19th, 2012

I believe we are going through a period I call the changing nature of deployments and engagements.  We are seeing an entire range of deployments developed using an enhanced approach…..from peacekeeping to partner support to training to threat network engagements, etc…….all “limited engagements with limited aims,” as a friend calls them.  They will be very much in keeping with what has typically been seen as the Marine Corps’ expeditionary and self-reliant nature, and they will be more SOF-like in composition, seasoning and capabilities.  They will be “more brains, less bullets”, “team game” with the requirement for more comprehensive and richer intelligence and socio-cultural knowledge prior to and during the engagement or mission or deployment.  The deployed unit’s organization and skill set will see greater emphasis on information gathering, thinking and sensemaking, understanding the complex and dynamic combination of phenomena that will be unique to each deployment. This will require more thoughtfulness on the part of the mission commander and more intelligence, collection and analysis skills and involvement……..in the mission unit and at echelons above, where more seasoned experts and analysts will contribute to, augment the knowledge and understanding of the mission, as well as learn from the details of the situation produced by assets in the mission team.

With this theory in mind, I recommend to you the following article authored by Greg Moore, a veteran of multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan as an Army Military Intelligence Officer.  The piece is titled “Predicting the Next Army Transformation: From the BCT to the Small Unit of Action, and it appeared in the Small Wars Journal on November 9th.

 

The Army’s transformation to Brigade Combat Teams was the formal recognition of changes in tactics and task organization that had been in practice in the field for almost twenty years. The predictable next step is a near-term transformation to battalion-based Battle Groups, similar to how many of our allies fight. Our current practice of task organization already treats the brigade headquarters as a generic interchangeable headquarters for Battalion Task Forces and specialty companies. While self-contained Battalion Task Forces planning and directing operations are the new normal, the emerging trend is Company Command Posts rapidly expanding in capability and carving out a new role. From observing current practice in the field and task organization of Special Operations Forces, the future of this trend leads toward an Objective Force structure based on a small platoon-sized Unit of Action and company-level First C2 Node, with additional echelons providing geographic or mission-based grouping under higher headquarters. This article is not intended to propose a new concept, but recognize and predict the eventual outcome of a trend that is already happening in the field.

A Lesson from History

A few years ago I was at an Army conference, and a four-star general was giving a briefing on Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Transformation. A slide that caught my attention showed a trend line through history of the Army’s key “unit of action” going from Army Groups and Armies to Corps, to Divisions, and then to Brigades, with points about the reasons for these historical trends. The slide created the feeling that the continuing trend towards being smaller and more empowered at the lower units inevitably resulted in the move from division-based formations to brigade-based formation.

I heard my own version of the history of this BCT Transformation from veterans of the Army in the 1980’s. From their description, units in Germany had determined that a Division composed of Infantry Brigades with separate battalions for supporting warfighting functions (Intelligence, Engineers, etc.) was unwieldy, and they had created an innovative idea of breaking up the old structure into ‘teams’ of habitually grouped functional units that deployed in support of each brigade. This grew in popularity until habitual relationships were codified into having “direct support” companies within the separate battalions, that were aligned with specific brigades, and “general support” companies still supporting the division as a whole. It was already common practice to refer to a brigade and its habitual enablers deploying as a force package, whether to Kosovo or the National Training Center, as a “brigade combat team.” As they told it, after twenty years of operating in this fashion, when the Army went through a “transformation” of re-organizing units into Brigade Combat Teams, it just acknowledged the de facto structure and made it official.

During the question and answer period, I asked the general, based on this trend line through history, how long did he think it would be until we made the next transformation to “Battalion Combat Teams?” He replied that we would not have another transformation because the Brigade Combat Team was as low an echelon as we could effectively organize around.

I was shocked by the lack of vision and awareness in his answer, because I had deployed on what was essentially a stand-alone “Battalion Combat Team” several years before in 2003, and it should be evident to those currently fighting in the field that we are already beyond a Brigade Combat Team-centric paradigm in current practice. The focus of our formations today is already on battalions and is shifting to companies. The U.S. Marine Corps operates primarily in a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) framework, with a formation built around a Battalion Landing Team. Many of our allies already operate in battalion-centric formations called Battle Groups (or Battlegroups in the UK) along with Company Task Groups, and a paradigm that allows multinational interoperability within NATO and the EU militaries. Few of our allies deploy brigade-sized forces for expeditionary operations, and it’s much more common to see battalion or company-sized contingents provided by allies. In fact, our Special Operations Forces are normally task organized around even smaller formations in detachments, platoons, sections, or “action arms” that are similar in size across forces, and work directly for a more capable “First C2 Node” that is frequently controlled by a headquarters acting as a hybrid of battalion and company.

Battle Groups and Battalion Task Forces

Around the same time that our Army was implementing the first Brigade Combat Teams, the Australian Army announced a reorganization into Battle Groups. This formation is also used by the British Army and many European allies. The European Union militaries are even organizing into multinational Battle Groups.

The Battle Group concept is very similar to our currently used Battalion Task Forces, which are essentially focused on creating self-contained force packages built around a maneuver battalion headquarters. Battalion Task Forces are the major echelon we focus on today in Afghanistan for owning and understanding their assigned battlespace. Enabling warfighting functions including Intelligence, Fire Support, and Sustainment, to focus on operating within Battalion Task Force frameworks and providing support to companies and their patrols. Within the Intelligence warfighting function, battalion S2s are considered the experts on the ground for their battlespace.

The Battalion Task Force is likely to be on the “Patch Chart” of the future, with more flexibility to deploy Battalion-sized elements from different specialties (light infantry, armor, Stryker) under generic Brigade headquarters. I had my own experience with this in 2003, deploying to Iraq as a separate Infantry Battalion from 10th Mountain Division, and spending time attached to different parent headquarters in the Army and Marines through our deployment. We integrated enablers including engineer companies, an artillery battery, a partial Military Intelligence Company, Marine Corps Intelligence and Communications teams, and occasional attachment of armor and mechanized teams.

While brigade headquarters continue to play a key role in Afghanistan as Battlespace Owners (BSOs), fewer of their operations are focused on being a tactical headquarters and more are focused on acting as sub-regional commands. The BSOs may be a BCT headquarters or may be formed from another O6 (Colonel) level command, such as a Fire Brigade or Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, and frequently have joint and coalition forces in their task organization. In Afghanistan, they may be organized to control the forces in a particular province, such as Combined Task Force – Zabul. The BSOs, like the Regional Commands (RCs) based around Division headquarters, focus on resourcing and coordinating the efforts of Battalion Task Forces, developing campaign plans for long term effects nested into the RC’s campaign plan, and using key leaders to engage host nation political and security force leadership. Day-to-day warfighting, while tracked in the Brigade’s Tactical Operations Center, is frequently planned, decided, and executed at the Battalion Task Force. The brigade will normally be at a large regional base, such as the provincial capital, while Battalion Task Forces are deployed to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).

While this Battalion Task Force framework is already the ‘new normal’ and has been emerging for over a decade, a new trend is beginning to emerge in the field now. The company level is becoming the focus of new capabilities intended to more directly the support the soldier on the ground. Increasingly, the most common missions are being conducted by patrols of platoon or smaller size, and the command and control (C2) of these missions is being done by a company Command Post (CP) that is rapidly growing in size and complexity. In Afghanistan, the Company is often deployed further forward from the Battalion FOB, to its own Combat Outpost (COP), and often has its platoons pushed even further forward to patrol bases, which may be more temporary locations.

Predicting the Trend: The Objective Small Unit of Action and First C2 Node

Is the Battalion Task Force the next Army Transformation? Or will we leap ahead to Company Teams? With the Army’s new focus on bottom-up capability improvement of the Squad, what is the ultimate “Unit of Action” where our historical trend line will approach its limit? The answer lies in the framework of the Small Unit of Action and the First C2 Node.

There are some good indicators available from the current fight, and from how our Special Operations Forces (SOF) are operating. Patrols, whether mounted or dismounted, have frequently found that the nine-man Army Squad is too small. Patrols are frequently undertaken at a Section, half-platoon level. This equates to about twenty soldiers, and fits well into four or five small tactical vehicles, two personnel carriers, or two medium helicopters. This unit size of twelve to twenty is extremely common, including Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alphas, Navy SEAL platoons, and other SOF teams.

In the SOF world, these units frequently conduct missions with consistent support of a highly capable C2 node that is their immediate higher echelon. The unit in the field can provide intelligence, receive mission approvals, receive fire support and MEDEVAC, and request additional resources through this first C2 node. While there is the desire to do this in the conventional Army, a lack of resources and flexible doctrine frequently requires coordination to be done at Company, Battalion, Brigade, and possibly higher to provide immediate situational awareness information or to coordinate for needed additional resources. A number of common tactics, techniques, and procedures have sprung up to address this, such as company quick-fire nets for artillery support, use of ROVER devices for receiving Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) feeds direct to the team on the ground, and the creation of the Company Intelligence Support Team (COIST) for providing fused, all-source intelligence directly to the patrol from the company CP.

Based on how these small units have been operating in the field in the Global War on Terror era (and going back to books from Vietnam and World War II, such as Platoon Leader by James R. McDonough, Company Commander by Charles B. Macdonald, or S2 in Action by Shipley Thomas), there are some key lessons to be extracted about the level of warfare where combat actually takes place, which are predictive of where the limit of decentralized operations will be reached. The key assumptions for this framework are that a fighting unit (patrol / section / detachment) is ideally sized around fifteen to twenty, and that the unit itself needs to be able to reach back to a Command Post that is out of direct fire and able to filter, fuse, and prioritize information flow to the unit. This suggests that our Small Unit of Action and First C2 Node are the limit for decentralization.

Institutionally, a company-centric force should not be hard for the Army to implement around Company Teams with their subordinate platoons. The Army is already organized around the company administratively: all soldiers are assigned to a company with its Unit Identification Code (UIC) on their documents, units are tracked and statused by UIC, property is accounted for by company under the UIC, and the company commander is the primary authority for administrative actions.

The greater challenge lies in increasing the capability of the company, especially in the Command Post, to be able to train, deploy, plan and conduct operations, and coordinate and integrate additional resources (Intelligence, Aviation, Fire Support, Sustainment) at their level. The number of personnel in a company CP cannot be expanded without limitation, so these skill sets will have to come from a small number of personnel with sufficient seniority, experience, and training to provide them. These personnel will require more unified and streamlined Mission Command Network Systems to bring all of that information together rapidly and intuitively, using tools that are accessible to cross-trained and multi-functional operators in a small command post.

Implications for Capabilities Developers and Mission Command Network Systems

One of the driving factors for this continued empowerment and focus on lower echelons in Afghanistan is a persistent problem getting timely, relevant information below brigade level to the patrol leaving the wire and the Soldier on the ground. Part of this is because of the mantra at echelons about brigade that they are “supporting the BCT” and once they get information to the BCT, their mission is accomplished. In fact, there are huge problems with the communications, classification, knowledge management, and horizontal and vertical sharing of information at echelons below the BCT. Too often the focus is on trying to solve this as a BCT problem, instead of on recognizing the need to focus on and address echelons below brigade.

While there is a growing amount of “stuff” being pumped into company-level formations today, from weapons systems to vehicle platforms to ISR data, the manning of the company does not include personnel with the experience, training, or authority to effectively integrate and employ all of these as capabilities. This will require significant changes to personnel design at the company level and battalion level, as well as some changes in thinking about career paths for some supporting warfighting functions.

An early place this needs to be addressed is in a unified Mission Command system at the company level that will allow the small, senior team to integrate multifunctional and multi-disciplinary information quickly. Instead of having single stand-alone boxes from each warfighting function silo co-located but not able to collaborate directly, the Mission Command Network System needs to be designed to function like the bridge of a ship… all functions integrated seamlessly at the local level, able to reach over the horizon to the network for more resources but not dependent on disadvantaged, intermittent, limited bandwidth communications to go back to a functional center and return before information can be shared across the room. An operator in the CP needs to be able to switch between Operations, Intelligence, Fire Support, Communications, and Sustainment views in a single view and without hundreds of hours learning function-specific software. There are a number of initiatives designed to provide the soldier in the field direct access to theater-level data through handheld devices. Without the intervention of the First C2 Node, this is likely to be overwhelming to some and underused by others, as the soldier on the ground needs concise, relevant information tailored to their immediate situation, not to be walking around on patrol searching for information.

Another institutional change will be required to share this framework across the joint services and the larger Defense community and Intelligence community, in order to get out of the “my work is done when I get information to the BCT” mindset, and focus on measuring effectiveness as delivery to the small unit filtered and prioritized through the First C2 Node.

A good secondary outcome of this framework is that it can be shared with allies. Countries that cannot afford to field Brigade-sized formations can instead focus on much more capable small units, with interoperability focused between their Company CP and other coalition forces. These interoperable companies will be able in the future to form Coalition Battle Groups.

A shift to Company-centric formations will not eliminate the need for higher echelons. However, their roles will take on a higher-level focus on campaign-level planning, resourcing and coordinating the efforts of Companies on the ground especially in large operations, and achieving higher-level effects in the battlespace.

Conclusion

As an intelligence officer, my job was to predict and model what was actually happening, rather than imagine new futuristic scenarios. In that spirit, this essay should not be seen as proposing a new idea, but rather predicting the outcome of ongoing momentum and where it leads. By recognizing the eventual outcome of this continuing trend, and looking to design tactics, doctrine, and organizations for that objective force, today’s Capability Developers can get ahead of the curve and maximize their relevance and value to the warfighter.”

 

We’d love to hear your views and comments.  Please write a note on the Roundtable, at www.lsi-llc.com, or send me a note at john@lsi-llc.com, and I’ll share your ideas with our readers.

 

Thanks.

John

The Look of Future Military Deployments, Continued: Special Operations

Thursday, November 15th, 2012

Special Operations Forces Face Growing Problems in a Shrinking World 

Contributor:  John Doyle
Posted:  11/12/2012  12:00:00 AM EST   

 

“The U.S. military is emerging from more than a decade of unconventional warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan to confront looming budget cuts in Washington, but leaders of the nation’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) aren’t counting on operations slowing down around the globe.

We will likely remain engaged against violent extremist networks for the foreseeable future,” Admiral William H. McRaven, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) told a Senate committee hearing earlier this year.

But that engagement won’t be limited to night raids, hostage rescues and covert insertions into hostile territory. Special operators will be partnering with the State Department and other federal agencies, as well as friendly foreign militaries, on non-kinetic programs to prevent extremists from capitalizing on political discontent, ethnic rivalries and economic frustration to fuel their strategy of terror and violence in places like Yemen, the Horn of Africa and countries bordering the Sahara Desert, according to McRaven and other U.S. officials.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton put it this way in a May 23 speech to SOF and defense industry leaders: “We need Special Operations Forces who are as comfortable drinking tea with tribal leaders as raiding a terrorist compound. We also need diplomats and development experts who understand modern warfare and are up to the job of being your partners.

She also told the gathering in Tampa, Fla. – home to McRaven’s USSOCOM headquarters – that “technology and globalization have made our countries and our communities interdependent and interconnected. And today’s threats have become so complex, fast-moving and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever hope to solve them all.”

The Defense Department plans to trim $478 billion in spending over the next 10 years, leading to force reductions among all the services – particularly the Army and Marine Corps. But USSCOM, a joint command that includes the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps special operations commands as well as the Navy Special Warfare Command, is expected to its numbers rise from just over 66,000 personnel now, to 71,000 by Fiscal Year 2015.

The Defense Department’s $614 billion budget request for Fiscal Year 2013 includes $10.4 billion for USSOCOM – down slightly from $10.5 billion in the 2012 funding request. The 2013 numbers include a baseline budget of $7.8 billion plus $2.6 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations – which in the past largely meant the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  

Even as the number of conventional U.S. troops drops in Afghanistan between now and 2014, when U.S. and coalition forces turn national security responsibilities over to the Afghans, USSOCOM officials expect SOF troop levels there to remain stable, raising their size proportionally as the other troops depart.

While the aggregate number of total personnel in Afghanistan will decrease as we approach 2014, the SOF contribution may increase by some small amount,” McRaven told the Senate Armed Services Committee. SOF make up just 8 percent of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but they have taken the lead in some major elements of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations – including programs to stabilize security in Afghan villages and recruit and train Afghan local police – as well as the continuing counter terrorism mission.

Beyond Afghanistan, the U.S. continues to confront a number of challenges from  “insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states and their proxies,” McRaven said. The concern is that these opponents will try to exploit gaps in U.S. foreign and defense policies that were developed in a more predictable world. And their use of cyberspace as a battlefield will make them more adaptable as they seek new ways to recruit, train, finance and operate. “In short, the strategic environment is changing – quickly and constantly,” McRaven said.

The USSOCOM commander expects those challenges to increase operational demands on SOF “across the next decade and beyond.”  SOF units are operating in 100 countries around the world from Uganda, where they have been advising  local forces tracking notorious warlord Joseph Kony, head of the Lord’s Resistance Army, to training exercises in Guyana , Uruguay  and Jordan with partner militaries.

Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, the Chief of Army Special Operations Command, said recently there are two different but mutually supporting forms of special operations. One relies on surgical strike, kill-capture-render safe tactics, while the other uses low-key, small footprint, counter insurgency, unconventional warfare capabilities to degrade and deter violent extremist organizations. “The nation needs both of those kinds of special operations,” Cleveland told a panel discussion on SOF and conventional forces at October’s Association of the U.S. Army conference in Washington.

McRaven calls them the direct approach – characterized by high risk, precise, small-unit actions – and the indirect approach of building the security capacity of partner nations and mitigating the conditions that make populations susceptible to extremist ideologies. He has said repeatedly that the headline grabbing direct approach only buys time and space for the indirect and broader government approaches to take effect.” 

 

Global Security and Intelligence Analysis: A Few Data Points To Think About

Monday, November 5th, 2012

“War on Terror: Radicalization and Expansion of the Threats”, Alain Bauer, Small Wars Journal, October, 11, 2012:
“The Arab spring, an occidental way to name very different moves affecting two kingdoms (Morocco and Jordan) with no real effects on the regimes, two military/Muslim brotherhood coup d’état (Egypt and Tunisia), two tribal wars (Libya and Tunisia), and two sectarian conflicts (Bahrain and Syria) did not, as any expert on the field knew it, keep its democratic promises.”

“The War on Terror has failed – not because war is not the right option, but rather because the enemy was misidentified. This is the same mistake that was made forty years ago when the war on drugs was identified. It was the right move toward the wrong target”

“Collecting information is not thinking. It is not possible to put together an effective strategy for combating terrorism or organized crime by simply collecting data (open or secret), even if it is then processed by the best available computer. Real estate is about location, location, location. Intelligence is about human resources, human resources, human resources.”

What leads to terrorism? Unhappiness, frustration, powerlessness, then hostility.

“Is Early Detection Possible?
“Criminologists have been working for several years on the capacity to detect potentially dangerous entities or activities as early as possible, well upstream of electronic intelligence gathering, with the idea of more accurately directing intelligence activities, bringing it to bear earlier on interesting targets. This work of detection is almost purely conceptual, does not require enormous material means, and yet considerably sharpens the senses of intelligence operators by alerting and informing them.”

“What is the sensitive point?” When, why and how does unhappiness give rise to frustration and then to powerlessness and then to hostility? “Early detection is expert observation grounded in the future of the bud, not the tree…..In a chaotic space, winning necessarily means forestalling events.”

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In the ICSSG, Intelligence Community Strategic Study Group,which I also quoted last time, another valuable exchange, this one between Aris Pappas and Charlie Allen:

Charlie Allen wrote: “What is missing is the value of the deeply knowledgeable, seasoned analyst. We need powerful tools that ingest vast quantities of data and narrow significantly the analytic data for review. But nothing will replace the experienced analyst who produces the all-source finished intelligence for the policy level. The policy maker may or may not act on the assessed intelligence but at least he/she has the best analysis that can be produced – not simply machine-driven results. The IC today is especially weak in strategic assessment and warning. I worry deeply about this weakness.”

Aris Pappas replied: “Actionable intelligence can be derived from careful, agnostic calculation as well as from complex, experiential understanding…….At those points in the spectrum where machines and technology can be used to sift, compile, and correlate numbers of data points that are simply out of the reach of the human mind, the ROI might be quite high. At other points, those referenced by Charlie, where analysis is dependent not so much on the data but on the creativity and understanding of unique individuals or teams, serious questions about the ROI might legitimately arise.”

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Another exchange from the ICSSG:
“There are probably more analysts now – a high water mark – than any other time in the history of the republic.” “I am not at all sure what this tells us other than that we have hired a great many analysts since 9/11.”
“About 2% of the NIP goes to analysis.”
“How many of the IT tool designers ever meet the analysts?….How much money is spent on tools – regardless of who designs them – vs. the money being spent on the basics of good analysis: reading, thinking, writing – and undertaking analysis when there is little data and little collection but the policy maker still needs an answer?”
“Lots of the issues that are of the greatest importance rely on smart analysts taking their best shot at a question, with some data no doubt, but often with very little. If we are training analysts to expect that there will always be data, to be data dependent, then we are foredoomed to analytic failure. We urgently need analysts to think beyond the data and sometimes in spite of the data.”

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I’d love to share your views and ideas with our readers after you’ve had the opportunity to read the article.  Please comment on the Roundtable at www.lsi-llc.com, or send me a note at john@lsi-llc.com, and I’ll share them.
Thanks,

John